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References and Further Reading 1. What it is Human nature is naturally good. At least it leans decidedly toward an awareness of the good, and a preference for it, over evil and injustice.
Despite appearances, human nature is inherently self-realizing and self-perfecting, if in moral understanding and aspiration more than practice.
Morality grows in human beings spontaneously alongside physical limbs, basic mental and social capacities. Both individually and in social interaction the human species evolves mature moral conscience and character despite the many psychological and social impediments that slow or de-rail the process for a time.
These are the basic tenets of moral development in its most vital, if naive historical form--a dominant perspective in ancient ethics and traditional religion. By painting human nature in this ultimately elevated and dignified posture, moral development visions grounded an ultimate hope in human progress.
They forecast the flowering of our species' most humane and admirable potentials, leaving behind its troubled childhood.
Under critical scrutiny, moral development notions gradually surrendered their identification of human psychology with virtue. But for German idealism, however, their credibility continued to wane reaching a low ebb in the mid twentieth century when the "naturalness" of human morality seemed hardest to square with the stunning inhumanity engulfing much of the world at war.
Only in the latter 19th century Is lockes distinction between primary and moral development revive as a lively research field in social science led by the cognitive-developmental approach of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. Newfound credibility for this effort was garnered by abandoning the traditional geneticist position in moral development, which depicted even sophisticated moral reasoning as a physiologically, age-determined phenomenon.
For cognitive-developmentalists, instead, natural development involves complex combinations of trial-and-error social interaction, guided only indirectly by certain implastic similarities in human motivation and basic cross-cultural institutions of social life.
While these processes allow great variation in moral and quasi-moral socialization, their interaction yields remarkably similar patterns of coping.
Only certain cognitive strategies seem capable of navigating basic social interaction successfully.
Research suggests that the cognitive competences fueling them and their ordering in a certain sequence are practically unavoidable for functioning in human society. And these cognitive competences are decidedly moral in key and holistic respects.
What it is for In human nature theory or axiology moral development notions convey a sense of ourselves as dynamic and progressive beings. It is normal for us to be ever-evolving and aspiring beyond ourselves even beyond the maturity of adulthood.
Being potentially perfect or self-realizing, we inherit an august natural legacy to fulfill in our individual characters and through community, which reveals our hidden but awesome inherent worth.
On this view, we owe it to ourselves not to sit still or languish in anything less than the full completion and perfection of all our potentials and powers. Morally speaking, making progress in this supremely elevated cause is less daunting than its supreme end-point would suggest.
We are naturally prone toward it after all. What we are obliged to do is what comes most natural to us deep down. The physical and psychological laws that govern our fundamental nature are all pulling for us, offering staunch and unremitting supporting for our journey toward ideals. For ethical perfectionism, supporting by natural development, the difficult "why be moral?
If we are so ideal deep down, why are we such disappointments everywhere else? Why do we fall so characteristically short in our characters and communities, showing all manner of vice and corruption, and making a cruel and violent mess of our world?
The typical response to such telling observations comes packaged in "alienation theory. Or the inside world corrupts us. The human part of our aspiration comes freighted with, and mired in, the lustful, grasping, animal portion of our heritage, a portion not only difficult to control but bent on running us morally out of control.
Or most ironic, we corrupt ourselves, conspiring unwittingly with these other corrupting influences due to the imperfect state and function of our all-too-slowly developing capacities.
Our aspiring saint within is dogged not only by demons without and within, but by the natural imperfection of time needed.Locke’s Distinctions Between Primary and Secondary Qualities Michael Jacovides1 Is there a distinction between primary and secondary qualities?
The question may rest on a confusion.
It is not obvious that it would be raised if the questioner knew what he meant by. Moral Development. This entry analyzes moral development as a perennial philosophical view complemented by modern empirical research programs.
The two initial sections summarize what moral development is and why it is important for ethics and human nature theory. The distinction is most famously associated with John Locke’s An Essay concerning Human Understanding. For Locke, primary qualities are those properties of an object that are not related by definition to perceivers.
The primary qualities are size, shape, motion, number, and solidity. Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities I want to take one more opportunity clarify this important distinction. In itself, the distinction is not hard to understand, but the language we use tends to blur the very distinction Locke is trying to explain, and all-too-often leads to misunderstandings of the point Locke is trying to make.
Argues that primary qualities are as mind dependent as secondary qualities. uses argument from perceptual variation: what looks small from a distance may look very large close up, what looks fast to us may look slow to another animal, eg housefly.
a cloud which looks pink from a distance looks grey close up. If the primary and secondary conclusion is not dependent on the atomistic assumption of reality but of the cause-effect relationship of experiences, then the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is tenable even in light of Berkley’s idealism.